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ABSTRACT 
By using micro data from the European Elections Survey 
this paper tests the different explanations for government 
party losses in the 2014 European Parliamentary (EP) 
elections. Using logistic regression, this paper finds 
support for all four tested theories, however, their 
dominance is geographically differentiated. Comparisons 
with earlier empirical studies point to the changing nature 
of EP elections over time. This finding suggests that 
future EP elections will be evaluated more as sui generis 
elections when its (perceived) importance further 
develops. The findings of this study contribute to voting 
behavior theory in EP elections and multi-level-
governance in general. 
Keywords 
European Parliamentary elections, vote switching, voting 
behavior, survey research, multi-level-governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the very first EP elections in 1979 losses for 
national government parties were observed [1]. These 
losses were explained as a consequence of the second-
order nature of EP elections, a term which denotes 
elections that are derivatives of national, or first-order, 
elections. This paper argues that the continuous 
consensus on this explanation in the literature [9] is 
puzzling for at least three reasons: The increased formal 
powers and policy scope of the EP [2], the increased 
importance of the EP in voters perception [3] and the 
increased politicisation of the EP, which makes it easier 
for voters to identify with parties on the European level 
[3].  
Arguing that EP and European issues be increasingly 
important for voters, this paper expects voting in EP 
elections, and therefore vote switching,  to be dominated 
by EU rather than national considerations. However, even 
most recent research explains government party losses by 
the subordinate nature of EP elections [4]  
Recent critique points to the homogenous methodology of 
most of these studies, which are almost all aggregated 
studies [5]. Micro level causal inferences on the basis of 
aggregated data is prone to  the methodological problems 
of ecological fallacy and observational equivalence. To 
avoid these problems, this study focusses on the micro 
level, thereby seeking to construct a more complete 
explanation of government party losses in multi-level 
governance elections, thereby focussing specifically on 
the EP elections and its changing nature. Combined with 
the idea that government party losses are the consequence 
of vote switching
1
 instead of strategic abstention [6], the 
central question of this paper is as follows:  
What explains vote switching from government parties in 
national elections to opposition parties in the 2014 EP 
elections? 
The 2014 EP election is an under researched case and a 
most likely case to find so-called sui generis
2
 effects 
because it is the most important EP election following 
voter perception [3]. Taking geographical differentiation 
into account this paper analyses Western- and Eastern 
member states separately
3
. 
WHAT THEORY TELLS US 
The literature can broadly be divided in two perspectives: 
the barometer- and sui generis explanations. Four 
dominant theories can be derived from the current 
literature in these categories, respectively: referendum 
voting, economic voting, sincere voting and EU voting. 
The first two fall within the barometer perspective while 
the last two are denoted as sui generis. After discussing 
each theory briefly the derived hypotheses will be stated. 
Barometer 
Barometer elections are defined as: ‘[…] elections that 
reflect changes in citizens' attitudes towards the 
government in response to changing political and 
economic conditions, in absence of the opportunity to 
install a new Executive’ [7]. The barometer concept 
therefore measures ‘pressure on the government’ [7]. The 
question, is then however: ‘does dissatisfaction with 
government parties [signified by a loss of popularity in 
EP elections] reflect a natural ‘cycle of popularity’ for 
regimes or a negative retrospective judgment of economic 
performance?’ [8]. These two competing explanations are 
embodied by the theories of referendum voting and 
economic voting. 
(1) Referendum voting 
The barometer nature of EP elections make them less 
important for voters, who are therefore voting more 
                                                          
1 Vote switching is used to denote those people who participated in both 
the 2014 EP- and most near forgone national election, and who defected 
from a government party on the EU level. The group which switched the 
other way around is negligible and will not be discussed in this paper. 
2   Meaning ‘unique’ or ‘on its own’. 
3 This conference paper is based on a bachelor thesis. Some 
simplifications have however been made, including the absence of other 
contextual variables like the original institutional effects. 
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 expressively, leading to more protest and anti-government 
party votes [1]. EP elections in this sense serve as an 
outlet for public dissatisfaction on the national level, or as 
a referendum on government performance [9]. 
(2) Economic voting 
The economic voter hypothesis explains government 
party losses in EP election by an asymmetrical evaluation 
of economic government performance, where government 
parties are only held responsible for bad economic 
performance and are not rewarded for good ones [10].  
Sui generis 
Moving in the sui generis explanations, vote switching is 
not explained by performance evaluations of government 
parties on the national level, but by the different 
preferences voters have on the national and EU level, 
thereby assuming that the EP election is considered to be 
sui generis by voters. 
(3) Sincere voting 
Sincere voting here simply means voting for the most 
preferred party, which is the opposite of strategic voting 
[9]. Turning the barometer logic upside down, sincere 
voting is more important in EP elections because voters 
are less constrained by strategical considerations [9].  
(4) EU voting 
Another explanation for vote switching is the 
fundamental difference between EP and national election 
issues [6]. People then switch vote because they have 
different preferences on EP and national issues. The on 
average more pro-European manifestos of government 
parties therefore explain the losses of these parties [11]. 
Contextual variable 
Western- vs Eastern-Europe 
The Eastern-European member states have less 
consolidated party systems which are characterised by 
higher levels of electoral volatility, less sustainable 
parties and less clear positions of parties around dominant 
social cleavages [12]. These less consolidated party 
systems make it harder to hold governments accountable 
[13], resulting in barometer effects being less and sui 
generis effects being more present [13]. 
Hypotheses 
H1: The lower the perceived national government 
performance, the higher the chance of vote switching  
H2: The lower the perceived national economic 
performance,  the higher the chance of vote switching  
H3: The more voters base their vote on sincere 
considerations, the higher the chance of vote switching  
H4: The more voters base their vote on European 
considerations, the higher the chance of vote switching 
H5: The negative barometer effects on vote switching 
are weaker for Eastern than for Western member states 
H6: The positive sui generis effects on vote switching 
are stronger for Eastern than for Western member states 
Taking stock 
Figure I shows the discussed theoretical relations 
schematically. This paper takes a heuristic approach, 
arguing that the different theories do not exclude each 
other for three reasons: (1) Different voters can vote for 
different reasons, (2) certain voting behavior can be 
explained by a combination of the theories and (3) the 
explanatory power of the different theories depends on 
(here: geographical) contextual variables.  
 
Figure I 
DATA & METHODS 
To explain government party losses in the 2014 EP 
elections from a micro perspective, Eurobarometer post-
electoral survey data from 2014 is used. This paper is 
interested in those people who participated in both the 
latest national and 2014 EP election and who changed 
vote from a coalition party in national- to an opposition 
party in EP election. The dependent variable therefore has 
two categories: those who consistently voted for coalition 
parties and those who defect from coalition parties in the 
EP elections. All parties were coded ‘coalition’  or 
‘opposition’ using the database ‘Parties and Elections in 
Europe’ [15]. Because of the dichotomous nominal 
dependent variable, logistic regression is used to calculate 
the effect of the different theoretical variables on the 
chance to belong to the ‘coalition-opposition’ group when 
using the ‘coalition-coalition’ group as reference 
category. 
Country dummies are used to get a so-called fixed-effect 
model. Following conventions, the following variables 
are used as (socio-demographic) control variables: 
gender, age and social class [11]. A combination of (1) 
social-demographic-, (2) political- and (3) population size 
weights is used to get a representative sample for the 
average European voter in two pooled samples: Western- 
and Eastern EU member states. 
Taking the retrospective, satisfying, performance 
evaluating voter as a starting point for the barometer 
explanations [16], government performance is 
operationalized as a dichotomous indicator, while 
economic performance was measured on a 5-point 
interval like scale. Following the hypotheses, both are 
expected to have statistically significant positive 
coefficients. 
Sincere- and EU voting is understood in terms of the 
smallest distance hypothesis [6]. That is, voters rationally 
choose their most preferred party, with which they have 
the smallest ideological distance. Given that the left-right 
cleavage still dominates European party systems and 
following conventions [6], sincere voting is understood as 
the objective left-right distance between a voters left-right 
self-rating and the perceived party rating for the party he 
voted for in EP elections. This results in a 10-point 
interval-like variable. The dichotomous EU distance is 
calculated subjectively using self-placement on EU-
support compared with expert party coding on this issue 
retrieved from EUvox data. Following the hypotheses, 
both variables are expected to have statistically 
significant negative coefficients. 
Finally, all member states which joined the EU from the 
2004 enlargement on, with the exception of Malta and 
Cyprus, are regarded as Eastern European member states. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive analysis shows that vote switchers are a 
rather small group consisting of 8,6% of the voters who 
participated in both elections in the East and 13,2% in the 
West. Because the group of ‘opposition-coalition’ voters 
is negligible in number and additional analysis supports 
the view that lower turn-out in the 2014 EP elections is 
not disadvantageous for national coalition parties, it is 
concluded that vote switching rather than strategic 
abstention is the cause of government party losses in the 
2014 EP elections. 
Moving to the explanatory analysis, the bivariate findings 
show that all independent variables have statistically 
significant effects, which supports the heuristic stance of 
this paper. The more empirically rich multivariate 
analysis, presented in Table I, shows three models with 
model 1 including the two barometer variables, model 2 
the two sui generis variables and model 3 all four 
theoretical variables. To ease interpretation the analysis is 
split for the Eastern and Western member states. 
Significance is indicated by asterisks and significant 
effects in line with the hypotheses by bold coefficients. 
Interpreting model 1 learns that while government 
performance is statistically significant predicted in the 
expected direction in both the East and West, this is only 
the case for economic performance in the West. This 
indicates that when someone values the government and 
economic performance less, he or she is more likely to 
switch vote to an opposition party in EP elections, except 
for economic performance in the West. These effects can 
be theoretically explained by a general dissatisfaction 
with government parties or as a conscious punishment on 
economic or political performance.  
Moving to model 2 both the EU support and left-right 
distance have negative statistically significant coefficients 
in both the East and West, which is in line with the 
corresponding hypotheses. Both coefficients can be 
interpreted as follows: a higher distance between the view 
of a voter and the party voted for in EP elections makes 
switching from a coalition to an opposition party less 
likely. For the left-right distance this is theoretically 
explained as the result of the absence of strategic 
constrains on the EU level, while the effect of EU support 
is explained as the consequence of different issues and 
preferences on the national and EU level. Looking at the 
Pseudo R
2 
of both models what stands out is the higher 
explanatory power of the barometer variables in the West 
and the sui generis variables in the East, which is 
explained by the different levels of consolidation of the 
party systems. Model 3, controlling for all theoretical 
variables, subsequently supports the earlier findings. All 
effects stay statistically significant and are correct 
predicted with the exception of  economic performance in 
the East. The higher pseudo R
2
 in the East shows that 
vote switching is here somewhat better explained than in 
the West. 
Table I 
 Model 1 
barometer 
Model 2 
sui generis 
Model 3 
total 
Independent 
Variable 
East West East West East West 
Constant -1,654 
(1,145) 
-1,063*** 
(,273) 
,884 
(2,039) 
-,642 
(,458) 
,395 
(2,317) 
-2,449 
(,542) 
Government 
Performance 
1,229*** 
(,314) 
1,686*** 
(,097) 
  1,197** 
(,487) 
1,759*** 
(,153) 
Economic 
Performance 
,059 
(,189) 
,237*** 
(,052) 
  -,218 
(,306) 
,326*** 
(,079) 
EU support 
distance 
  -1,605*** 
(,460) 
-1,135*** 
(,116) 
-1,588*** 
(,491) 
-,884*** 
(,130) 
Left-Right 
distance 
  -,389*** 
(,096) 
-,108*** 
(0,20) 
-,371*** 
(,104) 
-,091*** 
(,022) 
Model Chi
2 
43,793*** 930,120*** 74,899*** 363,136*** 77,270*** 579,120*** 
Pseudo R 
(nagelkerke) 
,172 ,309 ,375 ,232 ,419 ,377 
N 1610 3751 1376 2507 1264 2323 
Significance=.1>p>,05*, 05>p>,01**, p<,01***. Control variables and country dummies 
included but not shown. In the second and third model Malta and Cyprus were not included 
because they had no EU score. In all models Romania and Croatia were not included because 
of a lack of cases. 
Reflection 
Table II summarizes the results by showing that all 
hypotheses are supported except H2, which is only partly 
supported because economic voting was not present in the 
East. 
Table II 
 Barometer Sui generis East-West 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H6 H7 
Supported X  X X X X 
Mixed evidence  X     
No evidence       
 
The findings of this paper are fundamentally different 
from the dominant view of EP elections as second-order 
elections, subordinate to national considerations. This 
difference is caused partly by the use of an alternative 
methodology. This paper argues however that the 
changing nature of EP elections over time forms another 
reason for these results. The scarce micro level empirical 
research of the EP elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009 
shows that where the barometer effects stay important 
explanatory variables for vote switching, the sui generis 
effects became more important over time [6][11][13]. The 
 here discussed findings of the 2014 EP elections fit in this 
pattern and suggest that a continuous evolution of the EP 
will go along with EP elections being more and more 
characterized as sui generis, or, judged on their own. 
CONCLUSION 
The descriptive analysis showed that government party 
losses in the 2014 EP elections are caused by vote 
switching from government parties in national- to 
opposition parties in EP elections. In the explanatory 
analysis evidence was found for both theoretical 
perspectives and all four theories of vote switching, 
strengthening the believe in this paper’s heuristic stance. 
The effects are however geographically differentiated 
because of the difference in consolidation of the party 
systems in the East and West. While in the West vote 
switching let itself be explained mostly by the barometer 
variables, the sui generis variables have a higher 
explanatory power in the East. It should be clear that 
these differentiated findings differ from the dominant 
explanation for vote switching in the literature. This paper 
explains these different results by the use of an alternative 
methodology and the changing nature of EP elections 
Comparison with scarce micro empirical studies of other 
EP elections show the changing nature of EP elections 
over time, with EP elections becoming more evaluated on 
their own. Generalization of these results should be 
understood in a prospective instead of retrospective way, 
meaning that the findings of this paper say something 
about the shifting nature of EP elections and therefore 
upcoming elections instead of the nature of forgone 
elections. This evolutionary effect is likely to become 
even more important in future EP elections because 
vertical and horizontal policy integration in the EU is a 
continuous process [2] and the EP will become even more 
important in voter perception [3]. The EP is the only 
supranational parliament in its sort, however, there are 
good reasons to believe that this evolutionary logic holds 
true for multi-level-governance in general. That is, 
increasing (perceived) powers challenge the so-called 
second-order nature of these elections and make them be 
judged more on their own terms.  
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